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tion of the expected costs[1,5,6,7]. The cost savings in this pro-
gram come from the flexibility granted to sources in determining
how to achieve the needed emission reductions and the competi-
tion sparked among emission reduction strategies[8,5,9,10]. The
environmental and economic success of this program has stimu-
lated policymakers at home and abroad to consider applying cap
and trade programs to address additional air pollution prob-
lems[11].
Description of Cap and Trade
In a cap and trade program, an absolute limit (a cap) is set on
total mass emissions for a group of sources for a fixed compli-
ance period. The cap is then subdivided into allowances, each
representing an authorization to emit a specific quantity of pol-
lutant (e.g., 1 ton of SO2). These allowances are allocated or auc-
tioned by the regulating authority to the emissions sources
included in the program.
During the compliance period, each source must carefully
measure and report its total emissions. At the end of the compli-
ance period, each source is required to surrender allowances to
cover each ton it emitted. If a source has insufficient allowances
to cover its emissions, automatic penalties are imposed.
Recent Interest in the U.S. SO2 Cap and
Trade Model
The success of the U.S. SO2 trading program has spurred
policymakers to consider using emissions trading as part of the
solution to other regional air quality problems in the U.S. A cap
and trade program, known as the NOx Budget Program, was col-
lectively established by 12 states within the Northeast (the Ozone
Transport Region) to help reduce the unhealthy smog levels that
pervade the area during the summer months. As a result, over
240,000 tons of NOx were reduced during the 1999 O3 season,
about 20% more than required. This cap and trade program for
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INTRODUCTION
The first national emissions cap and trade program, the U.S. SO2
Emissions Trading Program (also known as the Acid Rain Pro-
gram), received worldwide attention for its environmental and
economic effectiveness. The program has reduced an unprec-
edented 4 million tons of SO2 annually from participating utility
sources[1]. These emissions reductions have also led to improve-
ments in ambient air quality and SO4 deposition reduction in the
northeastern U.S., where ecosystems are particularly sensitive to
acidic deposition[2,3,4]. These air quality improvements and
environmental and human health benefits were achieved at a frac-954
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NOx will be expanded to other states to further reduce interstate
transport of NOx emissions.
Interest in cap and trade has also spread outside of the U.S.
Countries using or considering cap and trade programs to con-
trol conventional air pollution include Chile, Slovakia, Poland,
and China[11,12]. Cap and trade programs for greenhouse gases
have been announced in Denmark and the U.K., and the Euro-
pean Commission has proposed a Europe-wide greenhouse gas
emissions trading program[13]. Countries facing dual pressures
of economic growth and environmental improvement find the
cap and trade approach attractive since it can achieve significant
emission reductions during times of economic growth[11].
Experience has shown that cap and trade can be a powerful
policy tool when applied properly to environmental problems.
However, it might not be the right tool for every air pollution
situation. Several other policy options, such as emissions taxes
and technology standards, can be used effectively to address pol-
lution problems. A thorough discussion of the relative merits of
these policy instruments is discussed elsewhere[14]. Similarly,
although many other forms of emissions trading exist––credit
trading, emissions averaging, etc.––only cap and trade is dis-
cussed in this paper.
Finally, before a decision is made on any emission reduc-
tion program, there are a number of scientific, technological, and
other questions that should be answered. For example, there must
be an understanding of the nature of the environmental or health
problem of concern, the pathways of exposure, the location and
magnitude of the emissions sources that contribute to the prob-
lem, and the levels of emission reduction necessary to address
the problem. Similarly, there should be answers to technical and
economic questions such as the cost, availability, and performance
of control technologies. A full discussion of these questions is
beyond the scope of this article. Rather, we focus our attention
on whether cap and trade would be a suitable policy assuming
the above-mentioned questions have been assessed.
QUESTIONS AND CRITERIA FOR CAP AND
TRADE APPLICATIONS
This section offers a framework of questions for examining the
appropriateness of using cap and trade as a policy tool.
Can the Environmental or Health Problem
Be Addressed with Flexibility?
Cap and trade is premised on the notion that regulators need not
direct the level or location of specific emission reductions. In-
stead, these programs set an overall target and let “the market”
determine where the most cost-effective reductions should be
made. In some cases, however, it does matter where an emission
reduction is made. For example, some toxic emissions may only
have local health impacts in the area immediately surrounding a
facility. Allowing such a facility to buy allowances from other
facilities may not fully address the risks caused by its emissions.
In fact, it may make a situation worse by causing a “hotspot”,
i.e., an unacceptably higher accumulation of the pollutant in a
specific geographic area. Such a case may necessitate control-
ling all facilities emitting the substance at a certain level, negat-
ing the flexibility inherent in an emissions trading program.
In general, the more a pollutant is uniformly mixed over a
larger geographic area, the more appropriate it is for the use of
cap and trade. For example, greenhouse gases are particularly
well suited for emissions trading because their impacts upon cli-
mate change are not related to the geographic location where
they are emitted. Emission reductions made in China have the
same impact on atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases
as reductions made in the U.S.
Even when the location of the emissions matters, cap and
trade may be effective if the environmental goal can be met
through emissions reductions in a general region. For example, a
cap and trade program can reduce total loadings of a pollutant
into the atmosphere, particularly if these pollutants are transported
over a larger geographic region. This was the case in the U.S.
with the U.S. SO2 Emissions Trading Program, which is intended
to reduce acid deposition in the northeastern U.S. and Canada.
Similarly, cap and trade programs can address ambient air qual-
ity problems by reducing emissions transport that contributes to
adverse air quality. For example, if pollution flows west to east,
then it may be necessary to include emission sources west of the
polluted area that may prevent areas in the east from meeting
their ambient air quality standards. The NOX cap and trade pro-
grams in the northeastern U.S. have been designed to achieve
large regional emissions reductions that will reduce long-range
transport of NOX emissions that lead to ozone formation[15].
There are ways to assess the potential for “hotspots” and
develop features to avoid them if necessary. For example, if “hot
spots” are expected to arise in a particular area, restrictions can
be imposed to prohibit flows of allowances into the area. Alter-
natively, the use of allowances may be discounted or limited within
an area of concern. This may be particularly necessary for pro-
grams developed in a smaller geographic region where each
source contributes more significantly to an environmental prob-
lem. It should be noted, however, that if a program requires too
many restrictions on trading to avoid hotspots, it may be prefer-
able to develop a more conventional regulatory approach to ad-
dress the problem.
Just as it sometimes matters “where” an emission reduction
is made, it also may matter “when” the reduction is made. Allow-
ances are typically allocated for use in a specific compliance
period. However, consideration should be given as to whether
unused allowances from one compliance period can be used for
compliance in future periods. This type of “temporal trading” is
referred to as “banking. ” Allowing banking in a cap and trade
program creates additional flexibility for sources, encouraging
early emission reductions, and further reducing the compliance
costs.
Although the ability to bank allowances in a cap and trade
program can provide significant reductions early in the program,
banking can also delay the achievement of the emissions reduc-
tion target later in the program when banked allowances are used.
Because banking does not delay achievement of cumulative re-
ductions, this tradeoff does not represent an environmental con-
cern for problems such as acid deposition and climate change.
However, for problems such as ground-level O3, where the envi-
ronmental problem is caused by short-term episodes of high955
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emissions, analysis should be undertaken to weigh the potential
effects of banking. Experience with limits on banking in the north-
eastern U.S. NOx Budget Program and Southern California’s
RECLAIM program has shown that such limits complicated or
hindered the operation of trading programs[16,17]. Therefore,
these restriction types should only be adopted after careful analy-
sis.
Can Emissions Be Measured Accurately
and Consistently?
Monitoring plays a particularly important role in a cap and trade
system. Unlike many types of environmental regulation where
compliance is judged by adherence to detailed technology or
process specifications within a permit, cap and trade programs
require a purely performance-based test for compliance. Ulti-
mately, monitored emissions dictate how many allowances a
source will have to surrender at the end of the compliance pe-
riod. If one emitting facility uses a less-accurate emissions mea-
surement method than another and consequently underestimates
its actual emissions, then it could surrender fewer allowances
than are necessary to cover their actual emissions. If this occurred,
the environmental goal (or cap) would not be met. In contrast,
monitoring for traditional command-and-control regulation, if it
is required at all, is often aimed at ensuring the installation of a
specified technology or an emissions rate is achieved.
Under a cap and trade system, total mass emissions (rather
than just the emissions rate or concentration) must be measured
from each individual unit or facility affected by the program.
This complete and consistent accounting of emissions is essen-
tial to ensure that the environmental goal of the program is
achieved and that the overall emissions cap is maintained. For
some types of sources, total mass emissions may be difficult to
measure or estimate. For example, it may be difficult to accu-
rately account for all fugitive emissions from an industrial pro-
cess, and such sources may not be amenable to a cap and trade
approach.
With a cap and trade program, accuracy of measurement
and consistency among sources is even more important than us-
ing consistent measurement methodology over time. Program
designers aim for accuracy even if that means using an improved
(but different) methodology during the compliance period than
was used to establish the allocation baseline. In contrast, an emis-
sions inventory compiled for scientific purposes, such as to model
future environmental impacts of an emission, may rely on the
best available existing data, even if they are inconsistent across
sources.
Finally, because of the desire to ensure that each ton emitted
from the stack has been accounted for, monitoring protocols for
cap and trade program emphasize, not underestimate, emissions.
Therefore, there is often a need for a standard methodology for
substituting missing data periods. In the case of the U.S. SO2
program, these missing data rules require a very conservative
substitute value, e.g., a value that would result in the maximum
potential emissions, to be used for any hours of missing emis-
sions data.
Are There Differential Marginal Costs of
Abatement Across Facilities?
Cap and trade programs are most logical when emissions sources
have a variety of costs for reducing emissions. These cost differ-
ences may result from the facility age, technology availability,
location, fuel use, and other factors. For example, in the U.S.
SO2 Allowance Trading Program, there was considerable diver-
sity in emission reduction costs because of differences in the age
of power plants and the proximity to low sulfur coal supplies[18].
Where costs are different, there is “room for a deal”, as high-cost
sources have the incentive to buy allowances from low-cost
sources. Conversely, if affected sources tend to be relatively ho-
mogenous, their marginal control costs may be approximately
equal, and there is no incentive for trading. In this case, an emis-
sions cap and trade program is unlikely to yield a significantly
more cost-effective outcome than more conventional types of
regulation.
Is There an Appropriate Number of
Sources?
In general, cap and trade programs should include enough sources
to create an active market for allowances. If there are too few
sources, there may be few trading opportunities. In addition, even
if there are cost-effective trading opportunities in a program with
few sources, a static market may make potential sellers reluctant
to part with their excess allowances. These potential sellers may
be concerned that if business conditions change and they need
more allowances in the future, they will have difficulty purchas-
ing them. They may instead horde their excess allowances even
though it might not appear to be economic to do so. Finally, with
fewer sources, there may be more concern that larger sources
may exert market power and withhold allowances from the mar-
ket to drive up prices.
There is a tradeoff, however, in that the more numerous the
sources are, the more complex it becomes to establish a cap and
trade program. For example, a cap and trade program that allo-
cated allowances to every automobile driver would be difficult
to implement because the administrative costs of tracking allow-
ances and monitoring and reporting vehicle emissions would
likely be substantial. Thus, the number of participating sources
should be sufficient to provide for a fluid market, yet not so many
that program administrators are unable to effectively manage the
emissions and allowance data.
Are There Adequate Political and Market
Institutions to Enable Cap and Trade to
Work?
For the trading part of a cap and trade program to work, a coun-
try must have some of the same institutions and incentives in
place as are required for any type of market to function. These
include:956
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• A developed system of private contracts and property rights,
• A private sector that makes business decisions based on the
desire to lower costs and raise profits, and
• A government culture that will allow private businesses to
make decisions about “how” to reduce emissions with a
minimum of intervention.
As with all environmental programs, a cap and trade program
requires adequate enforcement to ensure that environmental ob-
jectives are met. However, unlike other policy instruments, cap
and trade requires credible enforcement for its cost-saving ob-
jectives to be met. For an emissions market to develop, there
must be confidence that emissions will be correctly measured
and reported, that compliance will be verified, and, if there is
noncompliance, that a significant cost will be assessed. Thus,
cap and trade programs will have greatest success in countries
where rule of law is respected and enforcement is consistent,
impartial, transparent, and politically independent. Participants
should clearly understand from the beginning how the program
works and how compliance will be measured and enforced. The
credibility of an emissions trading market will diminish signifi-
cantly if firms believe that rules are unfair, arbitrary, or unpre-
dictable.
Another important consideration is whether the relevant
government entity has sufficient jurisdiction over the geographic
area where the cap and trade program would be implemented. In
many countries, environmental programs are implemented by
regional or local authorities who must follow national policies,
but are given considerable autonomy in implementation. For ex-
ample, China’s provincial Environmental Protection Boards
(EPBs) have the main responsibility for running air quality and
other environmental programs. Similarly, in Slovakia there are
79 local districts that implement environmental and other pro-
grams. To the extent that cap and trade programs cover a geo-
graphic region with more than one local authority, there must be
some consistency in key design elements of the program. For
example, in multistate NOx trading programs in the northeastern
U.S., there are common requirements for emissions measurement
and reporting, common standards for enforcement, and common
penalties. Other design elements, such as allocation methodolo-
gies, might be left to the provinces or municipalities since they
have no environmental impact. Allowing different provinces or
municipalities to have different allocation schemes may have
competitive impacts, however, such as favoring firms within an
industrial sector in one region of a country over another.
Finally, even if a country does not yet have all of the at-
tributes described above, it still may be beneficial to develop the
infrastructure necessary for a cap and trade program in advance
of more comprehensive economic and political changes[17]. As
centrally planned economies transition to become more market-
oriented, they may also transform their environmental programs
to become more effective. Even if conditions are not yet ripe for
trading, the structure of a cap and trade program may improve
environmental performance. In particular, the emphasis on care-
ful mass-based emissions measurement and accounting may im-
prove the environmental accountability of sources. For example,
recent experiments in Slovakia and Chile have indicated that the
allocation process associated with cap and trade has served as an
incentive for more complete and accurate emissions invento-
ries[12,13].
CONCLUSIONS
Beginning in 1995, the U.S. Acid Rain Program was the first
national cap and trade program for controlling air pollution in
the world. The results of the program have been exceptional both
in terms of the magnitude of emission reductions and the mini-
mization of compliance costs among participating sources. To-
day, cap and trade programs are being seriously considered around
the world. As described in this paper, there are many advantages
to using cap and trade as a policy tool. However, it should not be
applied to every environmental problem. A thorough analysis of
the key questions examined in this article can help to ensure that
a cap and trade program will deliver intended environmental and
economic benefits.
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